1. **Women & the Vote**

**Professor Yeo, *Radical Femininity, Womens’ Self Representation in the Public Sphere***

**–** argues that womens’ dissatisfaction with being excluded from mainstream politics pre WWI led to the formation of suffrage societies

**ARTHUR MARWICK, *Women at War 1914-18***

* Marwick says early changes and suffrage societies less important as they had not achieved vote for women by 1914.
* Marwick states war accelerated changing attitudes and let politicians off the hook as could be seen as rewarding “heroines” rather than giving into Suffragette violence.

**MARTIN PUGH, *Women and the Women’s Movement in Britain since 1914***

* Pugh –says changes to women’s lives pre-1914 very important as made women more “fitting” to vote.
* Pugh says Suffragists most important due to respect of public, support of many MPs and Conciliation Bills.
* “…it has been claimed that women’s valuable work for the war effort radically changed male ideas (about women)… seems simplistic and erroneous.”

**PAULA BARTLEY, *Votes for Women***

* Bartley: supports idea of pre-war changes being important as empowered women to demand vote e.g. working with political parties.
* Bartley thinks Suffragettes most important as put “cause” on front page as well as sympathy and support over force feeding.
* “It would be naïve to believe that women received the vote solely for services rendered in the First World War”.
* “The significance of women’s war work in the achievement of the vote is therefore perhaps not as great as first assumed.”

**Did the War get Women the vote?**

**Constance Rover – YES!** Constance Rover, *Women’s Suffrage and Party Politics in Britain* 1866–1914 (1967)

* It is frequently said that women were given the vote ‘because of the war’… The war changed the situation in more ways than are obvious at first sight. The obvious effect was that women’s contribution to the war effort was seen and appreciated and that women, instead of being subjected to frequent criticism in the press and by public figures, were very generally praised. Public opinion became overwhelmingly favourable towards women.
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* Public opinion also became more democratic generally, as the shared hardships created a more equal society and lessened the emphasis on class divisions. There was a general desire that sacrifices should not be in vain and that a better world should come out of the war. Surely a land fit for heroes to live in might include a place for a few heroines as well?
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* The war emphasised the participation of women in the everyday life of the nation. It was obvious to all that women were driving vehicles, acting as bus conductors and filling many posts customarily held by men. As we might say today, women’s ‘public image’ changed and improved.
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* Besides these obvious changes, the war transformed the political situation… It was obvious that the campaign would recommence once the war was over if nothing was done to enfranchise women. It would have been extremely embarrassing and probably unpopular as well to imprison women who had played such an important part in the war effort.

Constance Rover, *Women’s Suffrage and Party Politics in Britain* 1866–1914 (1967)

**Paula Bartley – NO!** Paula Bartley, *Votes for Women 1860–1928* (1998)

* It would be naïve to believe that women received the vote solely for services rendered in the First World War. It must be remembered that only women over 30 were given the vote and the very women who had helped in the war effort – the young women of the munitions factories – were actually denied the vote. The significance of women’s war work in the achievement of the vote is therefore perhaps not as great as first assumed. In reality, women were greatly resented in both agriculture and industry… Men ‘froze out’ women workers, gave them no help and even sabotaged their work… The reasons for the shift which took place in Government thinking therefore need consideration.

* First and perhaps most importantly, there was a need for franchise reform in general. Large numbers of soldiers were ineligible to vote. This of course would not do.

* Secondly, there were a number of changes in Parliament which altered the balance between those who opposed and those who were in favour of votes for women. Several suffragist MPs were promoted to the Cabinet. More importantly Lloyd George, who was sympathetic to women’s suffrage, replaced Asquith as Prime Minister in December 1916.

* Thirdly, the war allowed a number of hostile MPs – Asquith in particular – the excuse to climb down. These MPs, though not converted to women’s suffrage, realised that reform was inevitable and used women’s war work as a pretext to change. Asquith’s remarks about the female electors of Paisley in 1920 suggest he still resented women’s involvement in Parliament – ‘a dim lot, for the most part hopelessly ignorant of politics’.

* Fourthly, in May 1915, the Liberal government became a Coalition government. The old fears that one party might benefit from women’s suffrage were laid to rest

* Finally, Britain was merely reflecting an international trend towards full democracy. Women in New Zealand, Australia, Finland, Denmark and Norway had already been enfranchised… It would have been a peculiar embarrassment if the mother of democracy, Britain, lagged behind other countries.

**Arthur Marwick – YES!** Arthur Marwick, *War* *and* *Social* *Change* *in* *the* *Twentieth* *Century (*1974)

* The process by which women's participation in the war effort brought considerable social, economic and political gains can be traced in a very straightforward manner.

* The first issues to stress this time are again strengthened market position and the desire of governments to offer rewards for services rendered.

* But two further changes are also critical: the increased sense of their own capacity and increased self-confidence on the part of women themselves; and, on the other side, the total destruction of all the old arguments about women's proper place in the community, which both men and women had previously raised against any moves towards political and social equality for women.

* In the political story what is most striking is the way in which one after another all the old leading opponents of the idea of votes for women recant, and declare that since women have played such a vital part in the national effort, of course they must be allowed to share in the politics of their country.

* However, political rights are only one side of the story.  Women also gained a measure of economic independence.  And, whatever the intentions of law-makers, they had gained a new self reliance and new social freedoms.

**Sandra Holton – NO!** Sandra Stanley Holton, *Feminism* *and* *Democracy* *(*1986)

* It seems reasonable to argue that British suffragists might fairly have expected to have gained the vote by 1918 if a Liberal government had been returned in the expected general election.  It is even possible that there might have been a limited measure of women's suffrage under a Conservative government.  All this must significantly modify those interpretations which stress the advent of war as the decisive factor in the eventual winning of the women's vote.  It might even be that the war postponed such a victory.

* What can be confidently asserted is the importance of women's suffragists' own efforts, especially the efforts of the democratic suffragists, in securing the strong position enjoyed by their cause at the outbreak of war.

* Women's war work may have been important in converting some former opponents, or providing others with a face-saving excuse to alter their positions.  But even before this, the political alliances the democratic suffragists had formed in support of their demand had ensured that women would have to be included in any future reform bill.

**GERMANY**

1. **Growth of German Nationalism**

**To support Cultural factors:**

* Golo Mann, *The History of Germany since 1789* - ‘most Germans seldom looked up from the plough’ (arguing that cultural factors were not important to majority of working class Germans)
* Andrina Stiles, *The Unification of Germany and the Challenge of Nationalism, 1789-1919* – ‘even in 1815 there were tens of thousands of people…who felt passionately that Germans deserved to have a Fatherland’
* Andrina Stiles, *The Unification of Germany and the Challenge of Nationalism, 1789-1919* – ‘Nationalism remained largely middle class before 1848’

**To support economic factors:**

* Ian Mitchell , *Bismark and the Development of Germany*– argues the customs & taxes in German states had held back nationalism
* William Carr, *A History of Germany 1815-1990* (on the Zollverein)he calls it ‘the mighty lever of German unification’

**However**

* Carr also says ‘Certainly Prussia was not thinking in terms of political unification.’ When he talks about their motivation for the Zollverein.
* Andrina Stiles, *The Unification of Germany and the Challenge of Nationalism, 1789-1919* – ‘The Zollverein was a force for unity in the 1840s’
* David Thomson, *Europe since Napoleon*– argues the Industrial Revolution changed the political order across Europe
* (Finlay McKichan, *Germany 1815-1939, Germany: The Rise of Nationalism*)
* ‘Unification of these states in a customs and trading union leads to the establishment of a unified political system.’
* ‘Prussia had more reasons than just economic, she certainly saw it [the Zollverein] as a way of uniting her own territories.’
1. **Rise of the Nazis**

 “There is little doubt that the stigma of the so-called “November Criminals” hung like a giant shadow over the period of Weimar Germany.” (Jim McGonigle, *Germany 1815-39*)

Many Germans saw the Treaty of Versailles as “a vindictive Allied plot to humiliate Germany.” (Jim McGonigle, *Germany 1815-39*)

“A republic nobody wanted” (Finlay McKichan, *Germany 1815-1939, Germany: The Rise of Nationalism*)

 “…to ordinary German, it {Hyperinflation of 1923} was the fault of a government that had accepted reparation payments….and appeared to have played no active part to prevent the crisis…deepening.” (Jim McGonigle, *Germany 1815-39*)

“.. a disastrous economic blizzard…” Finlay McKichan, *Germany 1815-1939, Germany: The Rise of Nationalism*) on the Great Depression

“Hitler would almost certainly have remained on the fringes of politics had it not been for the Great Depression…and the hardship if brought.” Finlay McKichan, *Germany 1815-1939, Germany: The Rise of Nationalism*)

“There is no doubt the Germany suffered much more than Britain and France during this period and Hitler exploited this misery to the full.” (Jim McGonigle, *Germany 1815-39*)

“Only the Great Depression put the wind in the Nazi’s sails” (AJP Taylor, *The Course of German History since 1815*)

 “{Goebbels’s} brilliant propaganda techniques played a large part in exploiting the Depression to win mass support...” Finlay McKichan, *Germany 1815-1939, Germany: The Rise of Nationalism*)

“The NSDAP was the fortunate position, unlike almost every other party in the Weimar Republic, of appealing to different reasons.” (David Welsh, *Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations*)

The crushing of the Spartacist revolt “destroyed any hope of cooperation between the different wings of the socialist groups…” (Jim McGonigle, *Germany 1815-39*)

 “Hitler was the Nazi’s greatest electoral asset”. (Cameron, Robertson and Henderson, *The Growth of Nationalism in Germany and Italy, 1815-1939*)

**John Hiden, *The Weimar Republic***

‘Although the time seemed ripe for a remodelling of society and a clean break with the imperial past, German socialists were neither fully prepared for revolution nor united.’

The Versailles treaty certainly did not doom the Republic from birth, but it did create particularly troublesome dimensions to existing internal conflicts and contradictions which had, to some extent, survived the revolution’

‘The [Nazi] Party derived enormous benefit from its continued effort to win over the rural population during the crisis. To vote for Hitler was for many a rejection of the existing system.’

**Mary Fulbrock, *A History of Germany***

 ‘Its [The Nazis] growing electoral support in the elections of the 1930 and 1932 was directly related to the growth of mass unemployment and the growth of political instability in this period.’

**David Welch**, in *The Third Reich- Politics and Propaganda*,

argues that people who voted for the Nazis did so not so much because of their conversion by propaganda, but because doing so would lead to a material improvement in their lives.

**Finlay McKichan** *Germany 1815-1939, Germany: The Rise of Nationalism*)

believes that the role of Goebbels, in charge of Nazi propaganda, was vital in helping to spread the Nazi message.

**Niall Rothnie, *National Socialism in Germany***

‘Never has any party prepared for power more thoroughly than the Nazis during the period 1925-1933’

**Nazis in Power**

**Martin Broszat, *The Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich***

Argues that Nazis couldn’t have maintained power without widespread support for their policies

Argues that that the German people fuelled by Hitler himself, the Nazi propaganda and their own social expectations , allowed Hitler to become the object of a cult of personality

Argues Hitler’s influence grew with the successful implementation of foreign policy

‘Hitler’s special authority as Fuhrer was founded in his charismatic appeal, and the ability this gave to integrate the nation as a whole’

**Robert Gellately, *The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy 1933-45***

Thinks that it was impossible for the Nazis, especially the Gestapo, to control Germany without widespread support. This suggests that consent and popularity was an important reason for the Nazis staying in power.

Says that it was impossible for the Gestapo to control an entire nation with their numbers and he points to the average German citizen as an accomplice to the Gestapo’s mission of state control and racial purification

Says that propaganda was so impressive that German citizens truly believed there was a Gestapo agent on every corner, watching their every move even though this was not the case

Says that Germans’ willingness to turn on one another created a self-regulating society ensuring the Gestapo could control a numerically superior target with little or no difficulty

**Ian Kershaw, *The Hitler Myth:Image and Reality in the Third Reich***

“For almost a decade after 1933, Hitler enjoyed a remarkable degree of popularity among the great majority of the German people”

He believes the Nazi propaganda machine plays the biggest role in the way that Germans citizens adored Hitler to the extent they were willing to spare him criticism when things went wrong

Says that Goebbel’s propaganda machine lured the German masses into a state of trust and misguided belief that actually outlasted Hitler

**David Welch, *The Third Reich, Politics and Propaganda***

Welch believes that the regime largely won over the working class through programs such as Strength Through Joy (KDF) which provided entertainment and travel opportunities.

**Detlev J. K. Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism In Everyday Life***

Thinks that Nazis kept control over Germany because the working class were too afraid to take on the Gestapo and SS.

Says ‘the Nazis’ use of terror in the working-class districts and the continuous pressure to conform combined to create a ubiquitous sense of persecution and insecurity, as in a city occupied by foreign troops

He believes that the working class as a whole may have offered some small measure of token resistance, but because of the Nazi terror apparatus, could not organise in any significant way.

He believes the Hitler youth at first possessed a major influence over young people however started to later lose its grip over young Germans.

He argues that the regime of terror was more visible to ordinary citizens than first thought and was actually approved and welcomed.

He acknowledges terror played an important role in the Nazis control of Germany but refuses to believe Germans were completely unaware and unwilling to support the state’s persecution of minorities

**David Welch,** ***The Third Reich, Politics and Propaganda***

argues that propaganda in Nazi Germany (particularly promoting KDF and other schemes) was largely successful – at least to the extent that it tended to limit opposition to the regime.

Catherine Epstein, *Nazi Germany: Confronting the Myths*

‘The Fuhrer commanded adulation and universal respect. His authority was the glue that held together the Third Reich’